The dealing in a synthetic drug and possession of a synthetic drug offenses, as in effect in 2012, are unconstitutionally vague.
Illegal search of car passenger’s backpack was a “lead” which produced testimony of driver about his prior knowledge of the backpack’s contraband contents, so that the driver’s testimony was “fruit of the poisonous tree” and should have been suppressed.
Protective orders can’t be reissued, renewed, or extended “ad infinitum based solely upon evidence related to the protective order’s initial issuance,” the petitioner “bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a new protective order or extension of an existing order is required.”
Jury reached guilty verdicts on lesser charges but hung on greater charges; court did not enter judgment on the guilty verdicts; “[i]t is unequivocal that if the trial court had entered a judgment of conviction for those lesser-included misdemeanors, Indiana Code § 35-41-4-3(a) would have barred the State from retrying Cleary”; concludes “that Indiana Code § 35-41-4-3(a)’s implied acquittal provision does not apply when the jury returns a guilty verdict on a lesser-included offense but deadlocks on the greater charge.”
“[I]n addition to instructing the jury (correctly) on the elements of attempted murder under a theory of direct liability, the trial court gave an accomplice liability instruction that . . . failed to set forth that an accomplice must have the specific intent to kill when he or she knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another to attempt to commit murder”; the error was fundamental due both to the general verdict form which did not indicate whether the conviction was based on the direct attempt theory or the accomplice theory and to the State’s repeated erroneous assertions that specific intent to kill was not required for accomplice liability.