Gibbs contends that pursuant to Aplin v. State, 889 N.E.2d 882 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), reh’g denied, trans. denied, he cannot be convicted of attempted sexual misconduct with a minor . . . because the target . . . was not a minor. In Aplin, the defendant, Matthew Aplin, had online conversations with a detective from the Fishers Police Department who was posing as a fifteen-year-old girl with the screen name glitterkatie2010. Aplin expressed his desire to have sex with “Katie” and arranged to meet her at a Starbucks inside a Super Target. Aplin drove to Super Target and looked inside the Starbucks. Aplin was then arrested and eventually found guilty of attempted sexual misconduct with a minor and child solicitation.
We affirmed Aplin’s child solicitation conviction but reversed his attempted sexual misconduct with a minor conviction. In our analysis, we began by noting a difference between the offenses of sexual misconduct with a minor and child solicitation: the former requires that the victim be a child while the latter may be established if the defendant “believes” the victim to be a child. . . . We then concluded that attempted sexual misconduct with a minor also requires that the intended victim be a minor:
The State charged that Aplin violated that statutory provision [sexual misconduct with a minor] when he attempted to engage in deviate sexual conduct with Dan Claasen.  If proven, this did not constitute the offense of attempted Sexual Misconduct with a Minor, because Detective Claasen is an adult. This conviction must be reversed due to insufficient evidence. As discussed below, the appropriate charge in these circumstances is that of Child Solicitation, whereby the State need not prove the actual age of the victim but may prove the solicitor’s belief that the solicitee is a minor. Aplin, 889 N.E.2d at 884-85 (footnote omitted).
. . . .
The State concedes Aplin is on point but argues it was incorrectly decided. We, however, believe that Aplin was correctly decided. This is especially so since the Indiana Supreme Court denied transfer in Aplin on December 4, 2008. If our General Assembly wanted to penalize defendants for attempting to commit the offense of sexual misconduct with a minor when the victim is an adult the defendant believed to be fourteen or fifteen years old, it could have chosen statutory language similar to that it used in the child solicitation statute, that is, “an individual the person believes to be” a child at least fourteen but less than sixteen years old. See I.C. § 35-42-4-6. However, our General Assembly did not do so. Pursuant to Aplin, the evidence is insufficient to support Gibbs’ conviction for attempted sexual misconduct with a minor. [Footnote omitted.]
MATHIAS, J., concurs.
MAY, J., dissents with separate opinion:
Because I believe Gibbs’ convictions of attempted sexual misconduct with a minor and attempted dissemination of matter harmful to minors should be affirmed, I respectfully dissent in part. I agree with the State that Aplin was wrongly decided. [Footnote omitted.] Although an actual child victim is required for a conviction of the completed offense of sexual misconduct with a minor, Aplin did not adequately explain why an actual child is an element of an attempt offense or cite any authority in support of that proposition.
 We acknowledge that in Aplin, the charging information alleged that Aplin “attempted to engage in sexual conduct with a specified adult, not that Aplin attempted to engage in sexual misconduct with a child but it was impossible to do so because of his misapprehension of the circumstances.” Aplin, 889 N.E.2d at 884 n.4. The Aplin Court then cited the statute that provides that impossibility is not a defense to a crime. Id. We find that the differences in the wording of the charging informations in Aplin and this case do not affect the outcome of this case because the intended victim here was, in fact, an adult.