Whatley does not contest the fact that he was in possession of cocaine in excess of three grams. He also does not contest that he possessed the cocaine within one thousand feet of the Robinson Community Church as charged. [Footnote omitted.] Rather, he asserts that the criminal statute and the statute defining a “youth program center” are unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. [Footnote omitted.] Insofar as here applied, I.C. 35-41-1-29 defines a youth program center as “a building or structure that on a regular basis provides recreational, vocational, academic, social, or other programs or services for persons less than eighteen (18) years of age.”
. . . .
The thrust of Whatley’s position was stated by counsel in closing argument as follows:
Did he [possess cocaine] within a thousand feet of a youth program center? No. He did so within a thousand feet of a church. Churches aren’t even covered in the statute. They didn’t charge a church. They charged a youth program center. . . . There isn’t a youth program center. It’s a church”
(Tr. at 166).
Conversely, the State argued, “It’s not the building, it’s not the primary purpose that determines whether it’s a youth program center, it’s the activities that go on there.” (Tr. at 179).
In terms of felony enhancement for violation of a “drug free zone,” the provision including a “youth program center” as such a zone, has not yet been the subject of an Indiana decision. This has caused us to seek guidance from other areas of the law and from other jurisdictions. Our research discloses several A. L. R. annotations bearing generally upon the matter at hand. See Mark S. Dennison, Construction and Application of “Resident Purposes Only” or Similar Covenant Restrictions to Incidental Use of a Dwelling for Business or Professional Purposes Does Not Violate Restrictive Covenants, 1 A.L.R. 6 (2005); Jay M. Zitter, What Constitutes Accessory or Incidental Use of Religious or Educational Property Within Zoning Ordinance, 11 A.L.R.4th 1084 (1982); Jeffrey F. Ghent, What Constitutes “Church”, “Religious Use” , or The Like Within Zoning Ordinance, 62 A.L.R.3rd 197 (1975).
The cases collected are not uniform, from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, in their analysis or in their results. Nevertheless, we find persuasive guidance from several representative cases which hold that the principal character and use of a structure is not changed by some ancillary or accessory use.
. . . .
In light of the precedent herein set forth and after careful consideration and deliberation, we hold that the Robinson Community Church was and remains a church and is not converted into a youth program center by reason of its faith-based activities for young people. Bi-weekly Girl Scout troop meetings and mentoring of children by adult members of the congregation were accessory or incidental to the existence and identity as a church. The church was not a youth program center. It remained a church notwithstanding the incidental activities not solely religious in nature.
BAKER, C.J., and MAY, J., concur.