On May 5, 2010, Hall pled guilty to charges that he had committed two residential burglaries in Fulton County, Indiana. At that time, he was serving sentences for burglaries committed in Miami, Huntington, and Wabash Counties.
On July 12, 2010, the Fulton County Superior Court imposed concurrent sentences of ten years, with four years suspended, for each of the Fulton County burglaries. However, the trial court ordered that the concurrent sentences would be consecutive to the sentences received for the burglaries in the other counties. Hall was awarded no credit time against the Fulton County sentences.
On the same day, Hall filed a brief in the trial court, requesting credit time for the days he had spent in pretrial confinement beginning when Fulton County served an arrest warrant upon Hall while he was incarcerated on unrelated charges. The request for credit time was denied. Hall now appeals.
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Finally, Hall argues that he was denied credit time to which he was entitled. According to Hall, because the Fulton County Superior Court order to serve his sentence consecutive to other sentences was discretionary rather than mandatory, he should receive credit for his pretrial confinement on the Fulton County charges notwithstanding the award of credit time against his sentences imposed in other counties.
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When a defendant is incarcerated on multiple unrelated charges at the same time, a period of confinement may be the result of more than one offense. Diedrich v. State, 744 N.E.2d 1004, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). If a person is incarcerated awaiting trial on more than one charge and is sentenced to concurrent terms for the separate crimes, he is entitled to credit time applied against each separate term. Stephens v. State, 735 N.E.2d 278, 284 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. However, “[w]here a defendant is convicted of multiple offenses and sentenced to consecutive terms, the jail credit is applied against the aggregate sentence.” Shane v. State, 716 N.E.2d 391, 400 (Ind. 1999).
Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2(d) provides that terms of imprisonment “shall be served consecutively” if, after being arrested for one crime, the individual commits another crime before his discharge from probation, parole, or a term of imprisonment imposed for that crime, or while he is on probation or while released on his own recognizance or on bond. Hall’s burglaries in Fulton County were not committed after his arrest for another crime but before discharge; nor were the burglaries committed while Hall was on probation, released on his own recognizance or on bond. Thus, the order for consecutive sentences was discretionary as opposed to mandatory. Hall finds this to be a critical distinction.
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We find Bennett v. State, 802 N.E.2d 919, 922 (Ind. 2004) to be controlling. In that case, the appellant had pled guilty to attempted murder in Crawford County and was sentenced to a term of forty years. See id. at 921. In the same year, he pled guilty to robbery in an unrelated case in Harrison County for which he was sentenced to a term of ten years. See id. The Harrison County trial court ordered the robbery sentence to run consecutively to the sentence imposed in Crawford County, and Bennett challenged that order for consecutive sentences as well as claiming that he was erroneously denied pre-trial credit time. Our Supreme Court held, “where a defendant is confined during the same time period for multiple offenses for which he is convicted and sentenced to consecutive terms, credit time is applied against the aggregate sentence, not against each individual sentence.” Id. at 922.
Here, the record indicates that Hall received credit time against his sentences in Huntington and Wabash Counties as a result of his pretrial confinement. If Hall were granted presentence credit on the Fulton County sentence for the time during which he was accruing credit on the unrelated convictions, he would effectively receive concurrent sentences, rather than consecutive sentences, as ordered by the trial court in this case. We find no error in the denial of double credit time.
NAJAM, J., and DARDEN, J., concur.