SHEPARD, Senior Judge
Officer David Bisard of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department had his blood drawn by a medical assistant following an accident in which one person died and two people were seriously injured. The State later charged him with several counts of operating while intoxicated and reckless homicide.
Bisard moved to suppress the blood test on multiple grounds. He contended that the medical assistant on duty had not followed appropriate protocols, and that in any event the Indiana Code prohibits medical assistants from drawing blood for these purposes. Largely agreeing, the trial court ruled that Indiana Code section 9-30-6-6 (2010) compels suppressing the evidence for purposes of the DUI charges, but not for the reckless homicide count.
We conclude that the medical assistant did in fact draw the blood in a way that followed physician-approved protocols, and that the statutes cited by Bisard do not reflect that the General Assembly intended to suppress blood evidence taken in a medical facility by a trained operator in the presence of the suspect’s lawyer. We therefore reverse.
Bisard went to Methodist Occupational Health Center (“MOHC”) for treatment of his injuries.1 [1 MOHC is now Indiana University Health Occupational Services. It is not a hospital.] There, Officer Stan Stephens of the Lawrence Police Department advised him of Indiana’s implied consent law, and Bisard consented to a blood draw. Appellant’s Amended App. pp. 15, 50, 319-20.
Stephens asked medical assistant Michelle Maga to perform the blood draw and handed her two blood collection tubes. Tr. p. 88. Maga noticed that the tubes had expired, discovered that MOHC’s available tubes had also expired, and called another clinic to have unexpired tubes sent over. Id. at 88-90, 55.
Stephens and other officers and Bisard’s attorney were in the room during the draw. Id. at 56-57. Maga used a swab to clean an area on Bisard’s right arm. Id. at 99, 119. She immediately realized that she had used an alcohol swab, which is not to be used when blood is drawn for alcohol screening. Id. at 56, 99, 130. She took off her gloves, washed her hands, gathered new equipment, and started the process over. Id. at 56, 99. She used Betadine, a non-alcohol swab, to clean an area on Bisard’s left arm and drew two tubes of blood from that arm. Id. at 56, 57, 119, 52. She then inverted the tubes eight to ten times to mix in the additive in the tube to preserve the blood, applied a bandage, and discarded the needle. Id. at 53-54, 104-05.
Although MOHC’s protocol required Maga to label the tubes, Ex. pp. 6, 10, 16, Stephens insisted on following police procedures. Tr. pp. 49, 61, 78. So, Stephens labeled the tubes as Maga watched, and she then initialed them as the collector. Id. at 88.
MOHC also had a policy that the capped tubes be given a seal and placed in a drug screen bag. Ex. p. 6; Tr. pp. 58-59. Although Maga tried to insist on using a seal, Stephens did not do so before placing the capped tubes in a sealed bag. Tr. pp. 58, 81, 88.
The blood results showed a blood alcohol content of 0.19. These test results are the only evidence of intoxication in the record.
. . . .
There is no breath sample at issue here, so subsection 9-30-7-4(b) governs, and Bisard’s claims rest on applying two parts of Section [9-30-6-]6, subsections (a) and (j).
Subsection 6(a) provides:
A physician or a person trained in obtaining bodily substance samples and acting under the direction of or under a protocol prepared by a physician, who:
(1) obtains a blood, urine, or other bodily substance sample from a person, regardless of whether the sample is taken for diagnostic purposes or at the request of a law enforcement officer under this section; or
(2) performs a chemical test on blood, urine, or other bodily substance obtained from a person;
shall deliver the sample or disclose the results of the test to a law enforcement officer who requests the sample or results as a part of a criminal investigation. Samples and test results shall be provided to a law enforcement officer even if the person has not consented to or otherwise authorized their release.
Bisard has argued that, contrary to subsection (a), Maga was not a physician or a person trained in obtaining bodily substances samples and acting under the direction of or under a protocol prepared by a physician.
The other provision Bisard argues is subsection (j), which, at the time of the blood draw here, said:
This subsection does not apply to a bodily substance sample taken at a licensed hospital (as defined in IC 16-18-2-179(a) and IC 16-18-2-179(b)). A law enforcement officer may transport the person to a place where the sample may be obtained by any of the following persons who are trained in obtaining bodily substance samples and who have been engaged to obtain samples under this section:
(1) A physician holding an unlimited license to practice medicine or osteopathy.
(2) A registered nurse.
(3) A licensed practical nurse.
(4) An emergency medical technician-basic advanced (as defined in IC 16-18-2-112.5).
(5) An emergency medical technician-intermediate (as defined in IC 16-18-2-112.7).
(6) A paramedic (as defined in IC 16-18-2-266).
Bisard’s argument on subsection 6(j) is that the Code requires suppression because Maga does not qualify as one of the actors on this list.
. . . .
On the admissibility of test results, the Code reflects starkly different legislative policies as between breath tests and blood tests. Subsection (d) of 9-30-6-5 (governing breath samples), explicitly declares that “[r]esults of chemical tests that involve an analysis of a person’s breath are not admissible” if certain requirements are not met. By contrast, the section governing bodily substance samples demonstrates a broader approach: “For the purposes of this chapter, IC 9-30-5, or IC 9-30-9[,] . . . samples, test results, and testimony may be admitted in a proceeding in accordance with the applicable rules of evidence.” Ind. Code § 9-30-6-6(c). That the General Assembly has explicitly barred evidence in breath tests where certain processes are not followed but not done so in blood tests is an important sign of its intent about how courts should examine the admissibility of blood tests.
A legislative policy that differentiates between the two types of tests seems altogether logical. Blood samples are obtained and analyzed by medical professionals who are trained to produce reliable results. Breath samples, on the other hand, are taken under field conditions by law enforcement officers who are trained in the best practices necessary to conduct the test, but not so expert in the underlying analytical chemistry. In those settings, we rely substantially on the results provided by a scientific instrument. Adherence to rules pertaining to breath test operators, equipment, and chemicals as well as the proper technique for administering a breath test are thus paramount to ensuring a reliable result.
. . . .
Bisard has argued, and the trial court agreed, that the Code requires suppressing blood test results unless the person who draws the blood is one of the actors enumerated in subsection 9-30-6-6(j), such as physicians, registered nurses, paramedics, and the like. The parties agree that medical assistant Maga is not one of those.
As with earlier issues, the analysis necessarily begins with the part of the Code governing accidents resulting in death or serious bodily injury, chapter 9-30-7. Subsection 4(b) of that chapter tells us that Section 9-30-6-6 “applies” where one of three actors is at work drawing blood:
“a person trained in obtaining bodily substance samples who is acting under the direction of or under a protocol prepared by a physician”; or
“a person trained in obtaining bodily substance samples . . . who has been engaged to obtain bodily substance samples.”
It is plain that Maga was the second or third of these. What is not plain is how Section 9-30-7-4(b) and Section 9-30-6-6 can be tightly read together. Is Section 9-30-6-6 designed to sanction blood draws from persons in the six categories of (j) whether or not they use a protocol approved by a physician? Why are physicians on the list in subsection 6(j) at all, inasmuch as physicians are already covered by earlier subsections in Section 6? And, as amended, should the courts conclude that any person “trained” and in a hospital may draw blood whether they are following a protocol or not?
As is often the case with statutes written at different times and with different problems in mind, trying to shoehorn these provisions seems likely to produce results that the General Assembly never contemplated and did not intend. The one thing we can say for certain is that the Code does not direct that samples taken under these various alternatives be automatically suppressed, as it does for breath samples. We conclude that the legislature’s specific reference to applying the rules of evidence and the implied consent statutes’ global purpose, as the Supreme Court has said, to “acquire evidence of blood alcohol content rather than . . . to exclude evidence,” Abney, 821 N.E.2d at 379, means that, standing alone, the fact that the drawer is not on the list in subsection (j) does not compel suppression.
This is not to say that anyone may draw blood or that it may be drawn in any manner. Rather, subsection (j) tells us that blood may be drawn at a licensed hospital or by certain people if not at a licensed hospital. To the extent that someone else draws blood, the evidence must show that the person is properly trained and performed the draw in a medically acceptable manner. Here, Maga had been trained to obtain bodily substance samples and performed blood draws every day in her position as a medical assistant. As discussed above, we conclude that the procedure she followed complied with the available protocols for drawing blood.
ROBB, C.J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.