Kornelik v. Mittal Steel USA, Inc., et al., No. 45A03-1011-CT-58, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind. Ct. App., Aug. 10, 2011).

An injured employee who settles with a third party for substantially less than the damages value of his claim without the consent of his employer or his worker’s compensation carrier can subsequently reduce his lien arising under the Indiana Worker’s Compensation Act by attorney fees and pro rata costs pursuant to Indiana Code section 22-3-2-13; however, the injured employee cannot reduce the lien in the same proportion that his full recovery was reduced pursuant to Ind. Code 34-51-2-19.

Read Case Clip or Read Full Opinion

Cynthia Welch v. Shawn D. Young, et al., No. 79A02-1012-CT-1407, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind. Ct. App., Aug. 4, 2011).

The Pfenning standard is applicable in the case of a mother hit in the knee by a youth baseball team member warming up, and to apply the Pfenning standard the Court must examine the actions of the alleged tortfeasor to determine if “the conduct of [the] participant” is within the “range of ordinary behavior of participants in the sport.”

Read Case Clip or Read Full Opinion

Randolph v. Buss, No. 33A04-1010-MI-684, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind. Ct. App., July 26, 2011).

Legislature intended that inmate’s left-over educational credit time after his release on parole would not still be available to him when his parole was revoked and he returned to prison.

Read Case Clip or Read Full Opinion

Lock v. State, No. 35A04-1010-CR-641, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind. Ct. App., July 26, 2011).

Evidence defendant’s motorcycle was going 43 miles per hour did not prove its “maximum design speed” was 25 miles per hour or more, a “design speed” the State had to prove in order to show defendant was operating a “motor vehicle” rather than a “motorized bicycle” so that defendant was guilty of driving while suspended.

Read Case Clip or Read Full Opinion

Lechien v. Wren, No. 48A02-1007-DR-882, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind. Ct. App., July 26, 2011).

“[R]epudiation is not a release of a parent’s financial responsibility for the payment of child support and is not an acceptable justification to abate support payments for a child less than twenty-one years of age.”

Read Case Clip or Read Full Opinion